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B e r n w a r d  J o e r g e s  (FR Germany)
Romancing the Machine— 
Reflections on the Social Scientific 
Construction of Computer Reality
New machinery, especially microelectronic control technologies (“The 
Computer”), play an important role in upscaling organizational and 
societal complexities. If people feel they must go ¿long with these 
changes, this in turn necessitates resymbolizations. And most people do, 
most of the time. Animation and personification of computing machinery, 
whether in its threatening or enticing aspects, are part of such necessary 
symbolizations. Social scientists want to study these processes and even 
partake in turning structural change into meaningful stories, where 
“non-humans” like computers, but also lesser machines [1], are given a 
proper voice. Those interested in the management and governance of 
complex organizations and political systems will profit from such “re- 
enchanting” symbolizations of complex new machinery.
Assuming, then, that social scientists’ counsel and interpretive support 
in a world of oiganizadons is shaped by their own “constructions” of 
computing machinery—how do they themselves conceptually approach 
“The Computer”? After an examination of the metaphorical bases of 
conceptual developments in computer science and social science, the 
main part of my argument concerns an explicit program, in a “new 
sociology of technology” (NST for short), to conceive of computers as
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something akin to social actors. Some contexts for this “romantic” 
development are pointed out, and some reasons for caution are offered.
“Marketing the Monster”
“A frequent theme [in computer advertising] is that of the secretary being 
portrayed as having a love affair with her equipment, or with her boss, 
for having conferred equipment on her that allows her to function more 
productively and at a higher plane, letting her achieve her true worth” [2, 
p. 138]. Computerization of production and communication processes 
has advanced rapidly, and there is no end in sight. In organizations, 
homes, and public spheres, there is a great need to make sense of those 
new experiences and requisite practices that inevitably are engendered 
by the massive pre-structuring of communicative and productive actions 
effected through computerized technical systems [3].
The history of computer marketing shows how industrial actors respond 
to this need. In their study “Marketing the Monster,” Aspray and Beaver 
[2] trace some of the industry’s persuasive stratagems in a U.S. cultural 
context of organizing. One central finding is a reinforcement of conven­
tional gender and occupational roles, which is apparent in early market­
ing images of the machines. Computers are projected as splendid male 
creatures, “almost always portrayed in roles of scientists, engineers, or 
executives; while females are portrayed as . . .  assistants taking their 
orders from male superiors” [2, p. 137]. But sexual stereotyping is hardly 
a surprising feature of computer imaging. How did advertising change 
with the “evolving technology” and with changes both in the social 
matrix and in the social sciences?
Aspray and Beaver explicitly excluded from their study “the image of 
the computer as brain and thinking machine.” Nevertheless, they provide 
an instructive sketch of the industry’s changing rhetorical schemes. In 
the early phases of introducing the technology, computers were presented 
as part of the American “Dream of Success”; they were going to make 
big business bigger and better. By the late 1960s, however, areas where 
computing technology promised to provide competitive edge—“organi­
zation, communication, and control”—had become, so Aspray and Bea­
ver say, “those increasingly identified as the roots of dehumanizing and 
alienating modem technology.” Think back to the intellectual and social - 
science atmosphere at the time, then giving rise to large-scale campaigns 
of advocacy advertising where firms such as IBM presented computers
“as the solution, not the cause, of a wide range of social ills, including 
traffic problems, pollution, crime, and minority unemployment” [2, p. 
139]. Not enlisting the computer, even when it failed to fulfill the dream 
of unlimited growth, still was paramount to not wanting to improve 
America.
The role computing technology played in the Vietnam war and in secret 
surveillance back home seems to have killed off such “corporate respon­
sibility” campaigns in the computer industry. They gave way, according 
to “Marketing the Monster,” to the theme of the “now generation.” 
Computers brought instant gratification and promised to “place at your 
fingertips answers to any question you need to ask, all you need to know, 
simply and easily,. . .  and to transport that information anywhere in the 
world—instantly” [2, p. 140],
Interesting parallels can be drawn between this movement and social- 
science controversies related to understanding the process of moderniza­
tion. While the early post-war period was dominated by a structural 
functionalism that saw technology as an unlimited exogenous resource 
for ongoing differentiation and higher-level integration of “the social 
system,” the 1960s and early 1970s brought a revival of critical theory, 
neo-Marxist structuralism, and conflict theories of social change. Tech­
nology became an internal power resource. But already, at the fringes, 
symbolic-interactionist, ethnomethodological, and social anthropologi­
cal formulations were advanced, eschewing almost all notions of “deter­
mining structure” behind the ongoing, highly contingent negotiation of 
locally situated and, in a way, “instant” social realities. Technology 
became a multiplicity of “social constructions.”
Small wonder that authors such as Heinz Bude can diagnose a “dis­
solving progress” in social-science theorizing from concepts of “The 
Social” as “external structure” to “internal structure” to, presently, 
“serial structure.” Here, social relations are no longer conceptualized as 
“necessary” and stable but rather as “extremely localized and ethereal 
relations which incessantly produce and immediately diffuse linkages” 
[4, p. 7]. Bude depicts “progress” in sociological thinking as intra-sci- 
entific change, entirely ignoring that “serial structure” concepts in turn 
reflect people’s responses to historical changes at the organizational and 
societal levels.
While Bude’s concern is not technology, it is easy to see how perfectly 
“serial structure” theorizing suits, not only advertising for the “now-gen- 
eration,” but especially prospective campaigns for recruiting into orga­
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nizations such advanced computing technologies as “neural networks” 
and “connectionist machines,” with their power to learn and recombine 
patterns of association incessantly. The motif of the computer’s multiple 
impersonation capabilities is already a standard marketing code.
Emile Duikheim, encapsulating much of his thinking on the relation­
ship between progressive institutional differentiation and meaningful 
everyday reconstructions of this reality, wrote this much-quoted sen­
tence: “The soldier who dies for his flag, dies for his country; but as a 
matter of fact, in his own consciousness, it is the flag that has the first
place___He loses sight of the fact that the flag is only a sign, and that
it has no value in itself but only brings to mind the reality that it 
represents” [5, p. 264],
If a soldier were to activate, in war, all his knowledge about the 
complicated (and far from encouraging) workings and dealings in his 
society, he would hardly be able to sacrifice his life for this society. If a 
secretary were to activate constantly her knowledge about the complex 
machinations of the corporation she works for, she would have trouble 
mobilizing the enthusiasm necessary to sacrifice herself daily for the 
firm’s well-being.
In the age of computers, marketing via advertising begins to look a bit 
old-fashioned, though. Let computers speak for themselves. Implement 
your message in your software along the lines of that basic formula, 
endlessly varied, to let computers refer to themselves with “I” and 
address their users with “You.” It is by such clever ventriloquist acts that 
“instant advertising” has been made possible. Computers “themselves” 
are made to mimic their producers’ projections and to vary them accord­
ing to preprocessed signals indicating users’ “needs.”
Computer metaphors and the rhetoric of technology
“We are aboard a train that is gathering speed, racing down a track on 
which there are an unknown number of switches leading to unknown 
destinations. No single scientist is in the engine cab, and there may be 
demons at the switch.” [6, p. 319]. Lapp’s somber rendition of technology 
out of control, totally disembodied from its natural scientist creators and 
taken over by extrasomatic demons, vividly captures popular fears. 
Curiously enough, organizational and industrial sociologists have long 
taken little analytical notice of “machinery,” the hard core of technolog­
ical systems. Some “New Sociologists of Technology,” as I shall call
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them, are by and large the first to accord systematic conceptual status to 
complex material-technical artefacts.
Computing machinery plays a prominent role here, often justified (while 
being a matter of research funding, too) by the unique character of these 
machines. This trend reflects lively debates outside of the scientific 
community in which radical departures from traditional industrial social 
forms have widely come to be symbolized by “the computer.” While 
machines in general are discussed in the following, emphasis will be on 
AI machines—advanced artefacts, capable of the programmed processing 
of very laige amounts of electrical “signals” at very high speeds and said 
by their designers to be endowed with “Artificial Intelligence.”
The example of some of the authors quoted, who exploit metaphors and 
other literary devices in their texts, has inspired me to use the metaphor 
of “butterfly and bat” for social scientists’ images of computers.1 It first 
occurred to me upon reading Sherry Turkle’s The Second Self, hitherto the 
most ambitious empirical (ethnographic) study of the cultural implications 
of computer technology [7]. In an earlier essay, “Computer as Rorschach,” 
Turkle had already formulated her central thesis: computers are projective 
objects, akin to Rorschach figures, those symmetrical inkblots designed 
by a Swiss psychiatrist in order to reconstruct the inner worlds of clients 
from their interpretations of unstructured visual material [8]. Butterflies 
and bats are common interpretations in the Rorschach test, and I use them, 
in turn, for interpreting social science images of technology. And, like any 
proper metaphor, it is meant to evoke several interpretations.
In the first place, it stands for the “projectiveness” of machine technol­
ogy, quite in tune with Turkle’s initial notion that technologies are mani­
festations of cultural projects. It also indicates the dual face of technology 
as a pervasive motif of social science interpretations of technology. 
Beyond this, the image evokes the tenet of symmetry in NST conceptual 
approaches. Lastly, however, “bat and butterfly” stands for the “fluttering” 
approach some social scientists take—one time coquettish and seductive, 
another time frightening and aversive—to the new machines. In this last 
sense, my argument is critical of taking “metaphors o f the field," loaded 
with meanings, as theoretical resources, and putting them to conceptual 
use in a social scientific study of technology. What happens when social 
scientists inscribe themselves in the “cultural context of organizing” [9] 
by becoming amplifiers for voices from the field?
Studies of rhetorical aspects of both organization theory and organizing 
practice have become an important part of organizational research. In a
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related line of research, focusing more closely on technological innova­
tion, the role of (technical) Leitbilder (guiding visions) in organizational 
decision-making and technical design is explored [10]. At yet another 
cultural level, David Edge has looked at the social power of technological 
metaphors.
Inspired by such perspectives in Durkheimian social anthropology as 
Mary Douglas’s “Natural Symbols” [11] and “Environments at Risk” 
[12], Edge pointed out images of society taken “like the cybernetic 
metaphor. . .  from the ‘hardware’ of control technologies,” which then 
contribute to “establishing and reinforcing moral and social control” [13, 
p. 310]. In his view, such metaphors support especially one response to 
contemporary social problems such as unemployment or ecological 
destruction, namely, to view the existing institutions as defective and to 
conclude that more “centralized controls” are required [13, p. 319]. 
Evoking Ralph Lapp’s “priesthood” metaphor for scientific elites and his 
dark image of modem technology quoted above, he argues that control 
metaphors taken from technological parlance play a dubious role in 
debates about present-day “crises.”
While Edge is worried about the conservative and affirmative functions 
of control metaphors in public debates, I am concerned with the role of 
metaphors for technology, in particular microelectronic technology, in 
professional social science discourse. But the underlying question is the 
same: how are images of technology, as advanced in the cybernetic 
sciences, related to social theories, and how do such theories in turn shape 
public culture, and especially organizational cultures?
Metaphors of technology in computer science
“[T]here is overwhelming evidence that we are now witnessing the birth 
of . . .  the indefinitely superior creatures that machina sapiens will 
become!” [ 14]. This splendid view, taken by Geoff Simons, speaking to 
industry and the general public from the National Computer Centre in 
England, echoes and amplifies a powerful metaphor for computers 
created by the computer sciences. Computer scientists sometimes exploit 
their public credit as creators of complex machineries in advancing 
wholesale interpretations of social issues. It may be useful, therefore, 
before discussing social scientists’ images of (computer) technology, to 
take a short look at computer scientists’ images of their subject proper.
Ever since the invention of “artificial intelligence,” controversies about
the “nature” of “thinking machines” have turned around the implicit or 
explicit question of their likeness to humans. Computer scientists—as 
much as many social scientists, philosophers, and popular writers—in­
terpret this issue as almost equivalent to the question of human beings’ 
likeness to computers. Thus Earl MacCormac’s “Computational Meta­
phor” covers both sides [15], and Pamela McCorduck’s Machines Who 
Think corresponds to an image of people “that” think [16]. Sherry Turkle, 
after studying the pervasive cultural impact of Freudian interpretations 
of human conduct, concludes: “If behind popular fascination with Freud­
ian theory there was a nervous, often guilty preoccupation with the self 
as sexual, behind increasing interest in computational interpretations of 
mind is an equally nervous preoccupation with the idea of self as a 
machine” [7, p. 24],
The issue of humans’ likeness to machines (computers) is phrased in 
different, though interrelated, ways. Sometimes the problem is epistemo- 
logical: can human behavior be explained in terms of natural or engineer­
ing science? Sometimes it is posed as a matter of historical process: is 
there a progressive “machinization” of human agency, especially in the 
workplace? Or it is seen as an ethical problem: what is the place of free 
will and moral responsibility in a world of determinate machines? Turkle 
particularly asks questions of this last kind, even if her central notion 
applies to all three. She sees a major shift in the “stages” on which these 
debates are played out. After having long been a theological issue, and 
then having moved to psychoanalytical debates, “[i]n the last quarter of 
this century it looks as though it is going to be played out in debate about 
machines” [7, p. 23].
Of course, the converse theme of the computer’s likeness to human 
beings is not new. Yet, while discussions in the early phases of “artificial 
intelligence” machines were about the reproducibility of certain specific 
cognitive operations (“to win a chess endgame”), they have since ac­
quired a new tone. Computer scientists of the latest generation talk more 
literally about the prospect of creating surrogate brains. And they seem 
to believe that these will merit the attribute “creature” or “living being.” 
Thus the Carnegie Mellon robotics specialist Hans Moravec is quoted as 
saying that we “are on a threshold of a change in the universe comparable 
to the transition from nonlife to life.” Similarly, one of his research 
assistants says: “Moravec wants to design a creature, and my Professor 
Newell wants to design a creature. We are all, in a sense, trying to play 
God” [17, p. 38], The question of whether machines share in “life” is, in
30 BERNWARD JOERGES (FR GERMANY)
ROMANCING THE MACHINE 31
other words, not only critically discussed by scientists, but asserted. 
Projected machinery endowed with intelligence is being squarely placed 
in an evolutionary context.
Metaphors of technology in traditional social science
“A lifeless machine is reified mind. It is only this that gives it the power 
to force humans into its service and to dominate their daily working life 
to the extent to which this is effectively the case in the factory. Reified 
mind is also that living machine represented by bureaucratic oiganiza- 
tion.. [ 1 8 ,  p. 332, translation by author, emphasis added]. Max Weber 
concentrated on such “living machines” as bureaucratic and legal insti­
tutions or monetary economies, excluding “lifeless machines” from the 
sociological purview for some generations of social scientists. Only 
recently have tangible technical artefacts attracted interest, particularly 
in a lively social-constructionist research scene, to which we come later 
(for representative collections see [19,20]).
Interestingly, a growing concern in the sociology of science and tech­
nology for “freestanding artefacts” tends to center very much on com­
puters. But the concentration on computers, and the perspectives 
developed, can hardly be understood without looking back to the way 
technology was traditionally conceived in the social sciences.
People have always breathed “life” into their creations—remember the 
powerful myth of Pygmalion. Conversely, they have always been afraid 
that their products may gain power over them, that the relationship 
between humans and machines may in some deadly way be inverted— 
think of the Golem theme, or Frankenstein’s monster. In the interaction 
between man and oeuvre, between creator and created, the topos of Life 
and Death plays a very important role.
The life-death metaphor has also been, unsurprisingly, at the root of 
social science interaction with industrial technology. The history of this 
interpretive frame deserves a separate analysis. Here a few observations 
suffice, starting with the central Marxian image of living work as a 
generic term for all human activity and dead work for machine activity. 
Weber echoes this metaphor when he contrasts the “lifeless” machine of 
the factory with the “living” machine of bureaucratic organization. (But 
is administration via the written word not bureaucratic rule mediated by 
a particular information and communication technology?) Note also the 
intellectual impact of Jürgen Habermas’ categorization of “System” as
32 BERNWARD JOERGES (FR GERMANY)
opposed to “Life World”; again, the image of life and death is powerfully 
at work—although bureaucracy no longer stands for “living.”
Another metaphor that regains acuity in contemporary interpretations of 
microelectronic information processing was the opposition of Mind and 
Soul. Here, soul represented the vital source of human activity, and mind, 
the cerebral alienation from this source. The mind becomes the enemy of 
all that has life—its product, technology, becomes the medium of a deadly 
counterprinciple. The mind-soul juxtaposition seems to relate back to 
what was, in the classical world view, the more fundamental distinction 
between life and death through the metaphorics of Hand and Head: manual 
work as living productive work; nonmanual work as exploitative work 
and work intended to replace living with dead work—technogenesis.
In sum, the social sciences have persistently dealt with industrial 
technology in the light of sundry metaphors through which reality is 
interpreted as a series of juxtapositions of fundamental forces and prin­
ciples. Technology almost always emerges as peculiarly ambiguous, 
tangled in both domains, even though, all things considered, predomi­
nantly as an element of secularization and disenchantment.
Contemporary social science debates critical of computers continues 
this interpretive tradition. Computing machinery is often seen as a new 
type of technology, wholly different in nature from older industrial 
technologies. At the same time, it is made into an incomparably more 
powerful vehicle of a countervailing unnatural and life-threatening prin­
ciple: computer technology as the medium of an even more far-reaching 
machinization, digitalization, algorithmization, moral-affective devasta­
tion, and expropriation of human capabilities in work and life.
Unlike the computer sciences, though, the social sciences’ preoccupa­
tion with technology has remained on highly interpretive, metaphoric 
levels. In their avowed “distance to the artefact” [21], social scientists 
still have not much to say about materialized technical systems. Except 
in ergonomics, they have contributed little to the actual shaping of 
machinery. And only a few scholars have focused their conceptual work 
on the social constitution of things and, more specifically, of technical 
artefacts. Those who did had no great impact on social science theorizing 
relevant to industrial and organizational change.
A “new sociology of technology” (NST)
Summing up this short overview, one might say that a quintessential 
metaphor of life and death in the social sciences peculiarly contrasts with
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an evolutionary root metaphor in computer sciences. Social scientists 
turning to an empirical study of computer phenomena encounter deep- 
seated interpretive differences in the two scientific cultures. Not only are 
these differences difficult to reconcile, but there is also hardly any 
empirical tradition for analyzing the social constitution of things. As the 
social sciences have unfolded into disciplines, technology as an element 
of material culture has almost vanished from their conceptualizations. In 
the face of computers, however, the excommunication of tangible arte­
facts and their aggregates from social theory, and their categorization as 
subject matter of “the other culture”—natural and engineering sci­
ences—becomes, so it would seem, untenable. Lately, some social sci­
entists have decided not to ignore machines any more.
I will now trace this newly awakened interest by referring to four 
sociologists who have advanced conceptualizations of machinery that go 
beyond traditional approaches. Since new theories have their own organ­
izational contexts, the following account includes a tentative interpreta­
tion of relations among variants of NST and their institutional settings.
The University of California at Riverside: 
space for sociology
“My argument [is] that, if AI is ever going to be successful, it will have 
to be done by sociologists, who incorporate precisely the bodily situated, 
emotional, situationally negotiated aspects of real human intelligence” 
[22, p. 184], In these words, Randall Collins, responding to critique from 
Norman Denzin, has recently reaffirmed the position he took in an essay 
on the state and vitality of the discipline, “Is 1980s Sociology in a 
Doldrums?” Writing from the University of California, anchored in a 
solid, old European sociological tradition and, all the same, gifted with 
the talent of synthesizing a proliferation of unorthodox and heterodox 
developments in the social sciences, he analyzes promising vistas [23].
Not that he would count approaches to science and technology among 
them—those are not even mentioned. Apart from methodological and 
strategic theoretical issues, he dwells mainly on gender and a new 
sociology of emotions. It is in this latter context that his only reference 
to technology appears. According to Collins, a future sociology of 
emotions will have major impacts on social science developments. He 
foresees a theoretical upheaval, “as we have to comc to grips with the 
grounding of language not only in cognitive aspects of social interaction 
but in what may turn out to be its emotional in ferartional «nhctraip ” Anri
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he expects “a practical contribution to the development of Artificial 
Intelligence” to be one of the benefits of this.
Collins claims that the computer sciences’ disappointment with “indi­
vidualistic psychology [that] has not cracked the code that will open the 
way to a computer that can think and talk like a human being" now makes 
AI research turn to cognitive and ethnomethodological sociologists for 
a better lead. “It may be one of the ironies of the 1990s (or possibly 
another decade thereafter) that one of the most ivory-tower branches of 
our discipline will turn out to be connected with sociology’s most notable 
practical applications, the achievement of high-level artificial intelli­
gence” [all quotes 23, p. 1349, emphasis added].
“A computer that can think and speak like a human being”—Collins does 
not specify the meaning he wishes to give to the term “like.” But read in 
context, he seems to have a homology rather than an analogy in mind. 
Note also that he adds “speaking” to the capability of thinking. This invites 
two observations. First, Collins surpasses the central AI debate, where 
emotionality is made a nobler attribute of humankind than intelligence. 
The road to functional AI machines will be opened by simulating emo­
tionality, or at least the linkages between cognition and emotion. Second, 
the tone is distinctly euphoric: sociology may at last unfold as a really 
practical science. A godsend for sociology, the computer.
Speaking from a highly reputable large university establishment, 
Collins’ rhetoric can be read as aiming at two things, one outside the 
sociological profession, one inside. In the first place, he argues the 
superior practical utility of sociology in an electronic future. In the 
second place, he points to the advantage of internal unity. If only 
sociology, as a profession, manages to work out intellectual compro­
mises (syntheses) between (in his rendering complementary, not con­
tradictory) old-fashioned em piricist stances and newfangled 
constructivist views [24], poised like a butterfly on its mirror-image 
wings, the discipline will hold its own in the struggles for meaning (and 
more) out there.
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology: 
more news from the East Pole
“We cede to the computer the power of reason, but at the same time, in 
defense, our sense of identity becomes increasingly focused on the soul 
and the spirit in the human machine” [7, p. 312]. In The Second Self
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Sherry Turkle, working at MIT, proceeds from a strict analogy between 
the cultural power of Freudian psychoanalytic constructs and the cultural 
impact of computers. Both are seen as “evocative objects” that “catalyze” 
dramatic changes in our thoughts, emotions, and actions.
In her research, Turkle untangles the way in which the two diametrically 
opposed groups of children (including girls) and AI theoreticians (all 
males) confront computers. She shows that dealing with these machines 
actualizes fundamental philosophical issues: What is it to be human? For 
instance, computers seem to force members of both groups to revise their 
culturally or philosophically taken-for-granted ontologies: hierarchies 
like “stones-plants-animals-humans,” built on schemes like “nonliv­
ing-living-sentient-rational,” become tangled. How can a new order be 
achieved where apparently nonliving objects obviously do perform ra­
tionally? Should humans and machines move closer to each other as 
opposed to less noble creatures? But no, are not humans part of all life, 
high or low, essentially superior to anything artificial, including seem­
ingly noble—because mentally endowed—AI machines? What are the 
grounds on which to build a new, consistent hierarchy? Turkle fascinat­
ingly introduces us to the epistemic struggles and solutions of small 
children, adolescents, hackers, hobbyists, players, and computer scien­
tists—and their metaphors.
How does Turkle step from research experience to conceptualization, 
from being there with the computers to theoretical authorship? In the first 
place, she claims that computers are machines of an extraordinary, unique 
kind because, unlike other technologies, they leave endless room for their 
users’ desires, projections, and intentions. Beyond this, she also allows 
respondents to seduce her into conceptualizing “the computer,” the way 
they do, as a challenging and demanding counteractor of humans. She 
reconstructs computers as endowed with somehow superior powers of 
reasoning, forcing us, their counterparts, to recreate our identities 
through a revaluation of our emotional and spiritual powers.
Turkle’s interpretation of computers is pretty well reflected in the image 
of the butterfly. On the one hand, she is largely optimistic, all in all, about 
the cultural and social changes and chances opening up with the appear­
ance of this technology.
As I have worked on this book I have often been asked, “Are computers 
good or bad?” . . .  No one asks whether relationships with people are 
good or bad in general. Rather we seek out the information to build 
our own model of a particular relationship. Only then do we make
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judgments about the possible effects of the relationship. We have long 
experience with this kind of model building of relationships between 
people, but we are only beginning to think in this more textured way 
about our relationship with technology. Computers are not good or 
bad; they are powerful. It is a commonplace to say that they are 
powerful in their instrumental use. The modes of relating to computers 
and the oppositions I use . . .  are a contribution to understanding the 
computer’s subjective power in a more nuanced way. [7, p. 322, 
emphasis added]
Note in this passage the analogy (homology?) between relationships to 
computers and to people. What is more, computers are seen as potentially 
friendly partners. Tbrkle differs here from social scientists who have 
drawn rather dark and at times pandemonic pictures. In her version, the 
computer is not a bat, really.
Her analyses remain somewhat lofty, on the other hand, swaying 
between projections offered “out there” and conventional conceptual 
repertoires. Especially, at no point does she deal with other “evocative” 
artefacts, and she seems to ignore that new mechanisms, transported from 
one cultural context to another, have always raised existential issues. 
Anthropological research in “developing countries,” for example, has 
shown again and again that technologies transferred from one culture to 
a very different one cease for some time to be technologies in a specifi­
able sense. Their status as systems of action becomes uncertain. They are 
experienced simultaneously as pleasurable in themselves or as entirely 
useless, as frightening machinations without any familiar value reference 
or as universal vehicles for fulfilling hitherto unsatisfied desires.
Turkle’s version of “the computer” might spring, at one level, from such 
transcultural situations. In any case, her analyses tend at times to elevate 
the enchanting and bewitching, disturbing and frightening experiences 
with “intelligent” machines at work or in personal life to the status of a 
core concept in social theory: “Under pressure from the computer, the 
question of mind in relation to machine is becoming a central cultural 
preoccupation. It is becoming for us what sex was to the Victorians— 
threat and obsession, taboo and fascination” [7, p. 313],
Again, one may ask how this account of computers relates to its 
institutional context, MIT. This “East Pole” of “High Church Com- 
putationalism” in AI Research, as Daniel Dennett puts it [25]—from 
where all rival views are looked down upon as romantically West 
Coastish—has also generated, in the past, radical humanistic critiques of
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computer technology such as Joseph Weizenbaum’s. Taking a lead in the 
“ethnographic” study of computers and their users, Turkle—who has 
since turned her interest to relationships between humans and animals— 
does not explicitly support “Minsky-ish” claims that computers will in 
the foreseeable future become morally accountable entities. And yet her 
cultural diagnosis fits appeals like Marvin Minsky’s to begin to see in 
computers “our true children,” because, unlike our real children who 
descend from dinosaurs, they are constructed in our own image—which 
will soon make these creatures of AI labs responsible, and us responsible 
for them.
L’ Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Mines in Paris: 
embracing non-humans
“[W]e must begin with a world that includes nature, society, and the 
obsessions and interests of men (instead of evoking a natural world 
distinct from society). Also we must establish a general map of resist­
ances that are met and used by the actors, whoever these actors may be 
(instead of establishing a map limited to social interests)” [26, p. 23, 
emphasis added]. Michel Callon is affiliated with another citadel of the 
technical sciences, France’s Ecole des Mines. In his study Society in the 
Making, he declares engineers to be the better sociologists, because they 
treat human and non-human entities “symmetrically” [26,27], Drawing 
on Alain Touraine’s action sociology and British social constructionism, 
he proposes to reconstruct and appropriate their concepts for an analysis 
of the constitution of technical artefacts. In order to do this he introduces 
the concept of an “actor-world,” consisting of “social” and “natural” 
entities, of non-human and human actors. “One must abandon the easier, 
conventional analysis that tends to constrain (these) relationships within 
a tight corset of sociological categories” [26, p. 42]. Taking his empirical 
material from a case study of the (aborted) project to develop an advanced 
electric vehicle for Electricité de France (EDF), in a race with Renault’s 
plans to develop “Le Car,” Callon does not discuss AI in this study. But 
his plea for borrowing participant actors’—particularly engineers’— 
concepts is unusually explicit.
After describing the social backdrop of the controversial R & D project 
in conventional terms, Callon proceeds by pointing out that this has 
meant reviewing all the entities familiar to sociologists (consumers, 
social movements, administrations, and so forth), but that one must not 
finish taking stock here.
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There are also accumulators, fuel cells, electrodes, electrons, catalysts, 
and electrolytes. For, if the electrons do not play their part or the 
catalysts become contaminated, the result would not be any less 
disastrous then if the users find the new vehicle repulsive, the new 
regulations are not administered, or Renault stubbornly decides to 
develop “Le Car.” In the world defined and constructed by EDF, at 
least three new entities that play an essential role must be added: the 
zn/air accumulators, the lead accumulators, and the fuel cells with their 
cohort of associated elements (catalysts, electrons, etc.). [26, p. 26]
Conflict and, in the event of success, a mutual balance of power among 
“the elements of the actor-world” is made a central concept in this view. 
Calloncan ask, for example, whether demand, that is, the potential buyers 
of a technology, are easier to influence than electrons moving between 
the two electrodes of the cell or “the world market of platinum.”
The approach involves certain methodological issues. The critical one 
seems to be Callon’s proposition to construct “natural actors,” next to 
“social actors,” and to substitute voluntaristic concepts, such as “inter­
ests,” which would make less sense for “natural actors,” with “resist­
ances.” The switching of terms, for both kinds of actors, is made 
peculiarly suggestive by placing it in the context of Touraine’s political 
sociology and its imagery.
Are natural actors bad or good, scoundrels or heroes, bats or butterflies? 
With Callon, this seems to depend largely on who manages to overcome 
their resistance and to win their cooperation. In the Electric Vehicle he 
doubtless saw a pretty butterfly (even if it did not unfold). Just as clearly, 
“Le Car” was an ugly bat. As with sociologists of other persuasions, this 
author’s voice is clearly audible in a study devoted to recording the 
polyphonous chorus of an actor-world comprising engineers, electro­
lytes, CEOs, piston engines, ecologists, and many others.
The group around Callon at the Ecole des Mines has definitely gener­
ated a new conceptual language for a sociology of “non-humans” far 
beyond computers, and has even persuaded some other social scientists 
to go along with such unheard-of conceptual generosity. There is little 
doubt that this could only be achieved at a healthy distance from the ivory 
towers and professional politics of academic sociology. “Learning soci­
ology from engineers” by closely associating with them, shadowing their 
professional activities, and understanding their cognitive stratagems 
comes easier in a wholly “technological” institution. It remains to be seen 
whether engineers let themselves be enlisted and whether engineering
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science proves more open to this discourse than to older ones in the social 
sciences.
Brunei University, Great Britain: 
how reflexive can you get?
“Hitherto abstract concerns in the philosophy of the social sciences can 
now be broached empirically by reference to the recent attempts o f Al 
researchers to probe the limit o f the distinction between human behaviour 
and machine activity. Thus the question of whether there are essential 
differences between humans and machines can be addressed with respect 
to attempts to develop a sub-class of machines which are, arguably, 
endowed with a human capability, intelligence” [28, p. 568, emphasis 
added]. Steve Woolgar, from Brunei University, named after one of 
England’s great 19th century engineers and builders, belongs to that 
group of sociologists of science who have mounted, over the past twenty 
years, the most forceful attack against traditional theories of science. 
From positions variously labeled ethnomethodological, phenomenolog­
ical, social-constructivist, interpretive, or discourse-analytical, the ideo­
logical nature of orthodox methodologies of science was revealed by 
providing evidence for the view that observations, conjectures, and 
refutations in scientific research are as culture-dependent, interest- 
driven, situated, and highly negotiable as elsewhere in social life.
In Laboratory Life, a study on endocrinological research, Woolgar and 
Bruno Latour (also of the Ecole des Mines) already suggested that there 
exists “an essential similarity between the inscription capabilities of 
apparatus, the manic passion for marking, coding, and filing, and the 
literary skills of writing, persuasion, and discussion.” Science, too, is “a 
system of literary inscription,” and scientific instruments produce (au­
thor?) texts [29, pp. 51,245], The attribution of “inscription capabilities” 
to scientific apparatus seems to foreshadow Woolgar’s explicit program 
for treating computers as subjects in his paper, “Why Not a Sociology of 
Machines?”[28].
The argument is modeled on neo-Wittgensteinian, post-Kuhnian “shifts 
in epistemological preconceptions” concerning the nature of scientific 
knowledge and practice. Just as the new sociology of science must 
transcend the distinction between “cognitive” and “social” in order to 
reveal these and similar dichotomies as scientists’ stratagems to perpet­
uate a privileged image of their enterprise, so must a sociology of AI not
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“adopt the distinctions, concepts, and assumptions of AI discourse.” In 
Woolgar’s view, the basic feature of AI discourse is the distinction 
between man and machine in terms of intelligence and non-intelligence, 
justified in turn by a “distinction between the metaphysical and the 
epistemological.” Taking his examples from the development of expert 
systems, he interprets AI discourse as entrepreneurial:
By virtue of their “political” skills . . . ,  certain individuals have 
become highly effective salespersons. In particular, they have mobi­
lized the distinction between man and machine in claiming their own 
particular (human) expertise to speak about expert systems (ma­
chines). They thus define the nature and character of the object of 
study, they establish that these are indeed the proper objects of inves­
tigation and they claim to be uniquely competent in speaking on behalf 
of these objects. The rest of us are obliged to defer to what these
privileged spokesmen have to say about expert systems___[T]hey
establish themselves as experts on the social order of expert systems. 
. . .  [0]ur uncritical adoption of the man-machine distinction would 
amount to compliance with the arguments of the entrepreneurs. [28, p. 
566]
Woolgar then distinguishes two options for a sociology “for and of AI,” 
depending on “our preconceptions about the nature of machines and 
human behaviour and. . .  on whether we construe of machines as subjects 
or objects of sociological analysis.” He finds a “sociology of the AI 
community” wanting because not much could be learned about AI 
researchers’ products. And he goes on to say:
[W]e can adopt the more current sociology of science position that the 
products of AI research are socially constructed. Under this rubric one 
would develop a sociology of the characterization, design and use of 
intelligent machines; the machines would be portrayed as socially 
constituted objects. Note, however, that this approach grants priority 
to humans as constructing agents, and this implicitly adopts the key 
distinction between humans and machines which pervades AI dis­
course. [Another] sociology of AI would construe intelligent machines 
as the subjects of study. There seem no difficulties of principle in using 
standard sociological methods in this approach.. . .  [TJhis project will 
only strike us as bizarre to the extent that we are unwilling to grant 
human intelligence to intelligent machines. [28, p. 567]
The latter is what Woolgar seems to advocate, shedding such questions 
as, “Are artificially intelligent machines sufficiently like humans to be
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treated as the subjects of sociological inquiry? Or, to reverse the more 
usual query, in what sense can we continue to presume that human 
intelligence is not artificial?” [28, p. 268], But he goes one step further 
and aigues that both approaches still “involve the implicit adoption of 
the human-machine distinction:” “ [W]e need to eschew approaches 
which are unnecessarily parasitic of participants’ dichotomies, and de­
velop a sociological approach which takes as its focus the human/me­
chanical language community; the community composed o f ‘expert 
machines and machine experts”’ [28, p. 568, emphasis added].
Again, to proceed “symmetrically” is suggested as the basic research 
strategy. Woolgar stops short, however, of assigning sociologists a prac­
tical role in the construction of AI machines, doubting the willingness of 
“neo-Wittgensteinians” to allow their arguments to be codified and 
programmed in the computationalist-cognitivist languages of AI [28, p. 
566]. In this sense, he does not keep up with the radical thrust of some 
sociologists of science, like Bruno Latour, who would (at least in princi­
ple) see sociologists in a role similar to that of engineers, struggling with 
“natural actors” [30].
In pursuing this program, one important issue would be to substantiate 
Woolgar’s hypothesis that AI practitioners do not in fact “talk INTELLI­
GENCE,” i.e., do not doubt that machines can think and talk, just as 
researchers do not, if one trusts laboratory anthropology, “talk s c i e n c e ,” 
or truth. Another aspect would be to find out just how the public 
spokespersons of AI “respond to the argument that the achievements of 
AI should not be evaluated in terms of their relevance for ‘intelligence’ 
or any other ‘mental’ phenomena.” Correspondingly, Woolgar con­
cludes, we should take AI machines as an occasion for “reassessing the 
central axiom o f sociology that there is something distinctly ‘social’ 
about human behaviour” [28, p. 557, emphasis added].
Woolgar’s interest here—to open up non-human phenomena for soci­
ological inquiry—is indeed important. So is his query about the extent 
to which we can “develop a sociological study of the human/mechanical 
language community where the ‘machines’ in question are, say, bicycles, 
missiles, or food processors” [28, p. 568]. And it would be too easy to 
counter his sophisticated scheme by saying that it might be too rash to 
strip human activity of the sole right to the epithet “social” in order to be 
able to ascribe the status of “subjects” to intelligent machines. But I 
wonder whether his analysis is not—so much for butterflies and bats—a 
bit tangled or even upside down.
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Is the crucial distinction—people versus machines—really a “strategic 
practice of members of the AI community”? Carl Mitcham concluded 
from his survey that today there is a consensus among philosophers that 
machines cannot think, while computer scientists do not agree [31, p. 
171]. Whether in the guise of the Computational Metaphor, the Computer 
as Person image (with Marvin Minsky even as a Society of Actors [32]), 
or of the evolutionary metaphor—the collapsing of the distinction is an 
achievement of the cybernetic sciences themselves. In fact, Woolgar’s 
main witnesses for the stark dichotomy are not bred-in-the-bone com­
puter scientists. And notwithstanding his own repeated admonitions to 
assert sociology’s right to deal with machines by not falling into the traps 
of AI proponents’ self-interested metaphysics, Woolgar not only appeals 
to AI practitioners’ suspected non-adherence to the distinction, but, in the 
end, explicitly to theoretical AI discourse itself: Computer scientists have 
probed the limits between humans and machines, inscribing a human 
capability—Intelligence—in the latter; social scientists can now proceed 
with an empirical critique of metaphysical prejudices concerning essen­
tial differences between (the subjects oi) machine activity and (the 
subjects of) human (social) action.
In a double sense, Woolgar ingeniously builds his argument so that 
studies from a marginal sociological specialty—a (post-?) theoretically 
ambitious sociology of science and technology—can be read as the 
avant-garde texts of the discipline at large in an era of reflexive modern­
ization [33]. For one, it is claimed that radically “reflexive” approaches 
like his show the way out of the epistemological, political, and moral 
perplexities that plague all of contemporary social science. For another, 
the legitimate dominance of the computer professions in a crucially 
important domain of societal development is challenged by “deconstruct­
ing” their social constructions.
Institutional settings
Sociological and anthropological conceptualizations are always part and 
parcel of disciplinary struggles for institutional autonomy and societal 
recognition (usefulness)— as Wolfgang Krohn and Giinter Küppers have 
shown, in no way contradictory but rather complementary objectives 
[34], Indeed, the four exemplars of NST can be seen as falling into a 
certain institutional pattern.
Collins, speaking from a high place of institutionalized social science,
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aiming at a synthesis of sociological mainstreams, carefully opens a 
window for social science to future technological challenges. Turkle, 
located in an institution where the social sciences, albeit proudly estab­
lished, are more closely tied up with economic and technical complexes, 
confronts the issue of social scientific contributions to the technological 
predicament more directly; all the same, her positively critical edge as to 
the cultural impacts of computers is still largely phrased in conventional 
(including Freudian) conceptual terms.
Callon, by contrast, housed in an almost “purely technological” insti­
tution of great reputation, sheds encrusted methodological restraints and 
develops a new sensitivity for “ways of world making” thathave, to date, 
remained strange to practically all of social science. And Woolgar, 
finding his way from science studies to AI engineering at a school with 
a strong polytechnic orientation, opens the gates to the multiple currents 
of “post-Wittgensteinian” conceptual and literary experiments.
Without making too much of it, a more general conjecture as to the 
institutional contexts of NST may then be hazarded: The closer its 
practitioners are to engineering science institutions and the further from 
established social science institutions, the less orthodox and the more 
open and unconventional styles of theorizing the making of technical 
worlds they pursue.
Romancing the machine
NST proponents, having rediscovered freestanding artefacts mostly in 
the form of computers, make these machines into something like social 
actors. How has this come about? In combination with a more or less 
radical epistemological relativism (albeit not in Collins’s case), ethno­
graphic research is impressed with evidence that “out there” computers 
are “constructed” as creatures, as rational and powerful counteractors, in 
any case as somehow autonomous agents. Special significance is given 
to the finding that such notions are seriously entertained, not only in 
everyday life or public imagery, but in theoretical and applied science 
and engineering discourse. What is more, images of, say, humane ma­
chines are painted in generally optimistic colors by their inventors and 
constructors—not least by the most prominent among them. But why 
should sociologists of technology begin to appropriate such interpreta­
tions as theoretical resources?
Social scientists who argue along these lines unwittingly may enter the
strange business of a “reenchantment of disenchantment.” To exploit one 
more time my simile: a certain intellectual flutter may be building up—at 
first sight, light and elegant: at second sight, rather batty. The historical 
process of disenchantment, in Max Weber’s understanding of the term, 
is closely linked to the capability and admissibility of experimentally 
decontextualizing material objects and events—according to a program 
of science oriented toward technological control since the Renaissance. 
Decoupling natural processes disciplined in apparatus (“socially 
normated natural events,” as Norbert Elias calls it, talking about time and 
clocks [35, p. vii]) from those normative and symbolic contexts that 
orient social interaction is part and parcel of this program and its 
manifestations. Rather successfully, if not linearly, such operations have 
been subsumed under their own proper norms and symbols—scientific 
and technical.
Relevant normative orientations include, for example, the desire to 
freely repeat, calculate, control, expand, and refine appropriate opera­
tions—and, above all, to achieve thereby a splendid indifference toward 
activities that cannot be normated, symbolized, and kept under control 
in this manner. The power of these orientations is great and not without 
its own magic. Yet, periodic disillusionments are just as great: aggrava­
tions and disturbances, not only in society’s natural metabolism but also 
in the maintenance of ultimately more powerful orientations, and 
reenchantment sets in.
Whether they want or not, social scientists will always be involved in 
such disenchaniing-reenchanting spirals, as it were. They cannot help 
taking part in the recontextualization of the technologies they study. 
Sociology cannot offer a meta-discourse that is itself insulated from 
technology. That is why distancing oneself and self-critical control of 
unavoidable and unwitting involvement seemed appropriate for a social 
science rooted in the Enlightenment and oriented toward an ethos of 
disenchanting that which can be disenchanted—including “the human 
machine.” For the same reason, social science rooted in a critique of the 
Enlightenment has called for conscious partisanship to and participation 
in a program of human betterment. In critical organization theory, for 
example, technical innovation has long been interpreted as an instrument 
of “depersonalizing” control processes in the interest of those in power.
The new sociologists of technology, so it would seem, are not pleased 
much with either strategy. Their theoretical recourse to everyday images 
and myths of technology and to engineering science discourse leaves the
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status of their arguments and their theoretical objectives uncertain. Are 
they acting as “private ironists” [36], exposing the hidden games of 
cognitive politics in computer science and its practical organizational 
applications by “deconstructing” them? Or could it be that a Zeitgeist of 
“romancing the machine” is getting the better of sociologists who are just 
beginning to venture into the world of technical things? In any case, the 
confusion of humans and non-humans (as if computerized expert systems 
had begun to publish their articles about the cognitive and emotional 
deficiencies of computer engineers or computer sociologists in their 
[whose?] learned journals) seems to land NST in a somewhat nervous 
epistemological state. What could be their aim (in Gifford Geertz’s 
words, talking about new anthropological rhetoric): “Factual accuracy? 
Theoretical sweep? Imaginative grasp? Moral depth?” [37, p. 133].
Technology as disembodied practice
The new sociologists of technology I have cited have not shown that 
people actually treat computers as actors in the sense of sustaining some 
form of social relationship with them. Their findings rather point to an 
ongoing process of change in the forms and meanings of social relation­
ships occasioned by committing human activities to machinery.
In the case of computers, this process may be particularly dramatic or 
obvious. The coming of electronic computational machinery has pro­
duced immense cultural perturbations and has contributed to a rediscov­
ery of a world of enchantment where older sociologies saw major sources 
of rationalization and disenchantment. It has also given momentum to a 
project of “revising sociology’s concept of the actor,” explicitly or 
unwittingly put forward in otherwise divergent sociological approaches. 
Appeals to language conventions and beliefs of those who make and use 
technical artefacts, conscious attempts not to insulate sociological dis­
course from public debate, and proposals to use the images of technology 
“out there” as conceptual resources play important roles in this under­
taking. Specific conjunctions of internal and external institutional envi­
ronments influence its course.
One will have to see what comes of this and whether computers will 
turn out the butterflies or the bats of a sociology struggling to come to 
grips with technology. (Of course, Thomas Nagel has demonstrated, in 
his essay “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” [38], that this question cannot 
be answered for the time being—for the same reasons that some enlight­
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ened computer scientists stubbornly remain skeptical of the emergence 
of humanlike machines. May bats then excuse me for potential metaphor­
ical misuse.) Another program would be to look out, in the first place, 
not for the stories people (including computer scientists) tell us about 
machines—“technology as text”—but for what people do with machines, 
and machines with people— silently: “technology as a body of 
‘disembodied’ collective practices.” And then to ask why accelerated 
complexifying of those special practices occasions, indeed requires, 
recontextualization—metaphoric understanding and narrative fiction.
Of course, we must keep inventing conceptual languages for talking 
about these practices sociologically. Both interpretive and more conven­
tional empiricist conceptual repertoires will have to be used in doing so. 
But even if in Anglo-American social science a certain readiness to give 
up uncompromising attitudes between the two “camps” is apparent [24, 
37] (while at least in German-speaking sociology, social constructionist 
approaches to technology remain to be acknowledged), I do not think 
that this will be possible within a unified conceptual scheme [39, p. 233], 
The hope seems vain to bridge the vast semantic differentials—between 
“machine languages” (should one decide that they have a language, even 
generate texts, after all) and the languages of those trying to make 
magisterial sense of “technological society,” say Mumford or Ellul or 
Latour—within one and the same discursive domain.
If one must, in order to remain convincing, choose a definitive concep­
tual repertoire, the “realist” assumption that what machines do lends itself 
easier to unequivocal factual descriptions than people’s actions, that 
here—to put it crudely—“faction” is superior to “fiction,” seems to me 
worth maintaining. To apply the paradoxical tenets of post-structuralist 
discursivity to computers and other machines (for instance, the notion 
that the entities “studied” should be made the true authors of one’s 
studies?) is a romantic idea, familiar in the present epistemic state of 
affairs in the social sciences and beyond. But one wants to be persuaded 
by more evocative reports from the field that computers can be thus 
enlisted.
In fact, recent research on the impact of computing technology on 
management and organization draws a “predominant picture of relatively 
hard-headed, instrumental rationality” in advanced computer applica­
tions [40, p. 232]. Rule and Attewell conclude from their field studies 
that computing, in its more sophisticated forms, “encourages managers 
to rationalize their practices” and effectively to control those broad
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patterns in the workings of their firms they always wanted to devise 
regular policies for but didn’t know how. “The ability of the computer to 
assimilate and condense large amounts of discrete data is essential for 
such changes. In this respect, computing offers yet another force on 
behalf of the mastery of a chaotic universe . . . ,  or another step in what 
Weber . . .  called the ‘disenchantment of the world’ ” [40, p. 239]. (Of 
course, this is yet another piece of rhetoric from an admittedly non-eth- 
nographic encounter.)
The question to be asked, then, is not Turing’s (in)famous “Can ma- 
iUiAK.  chinesaet?” (adding unbehavioristically that to avoid endless discussions 
as to who can, it is common “to have the polite convention that everyone 
does” [41, p. 446]) but more generally: “Do machines act?” Yes, ma­
chines act. But those ensembles of the most minimal and trivial of actions 
they perform—actions invented because they could not be performed 
within our bodies in similar quantity, speed, and precision—may better 
be conceived of as part of collective human practices than as a society of 
homunculi in their own right. For better or worse, machines—and 
particularly computers—act for or against us. Attributing them sentience 
of one kind or another is inevitable as long as they cannot be totally 
disembodied. Attributing them “symmetry” as “actors” would be war­
ranted, I should think, once this has been achieved and once they start 
“talking back” in a discourse that deserves to be called existential—if not 
moral.
Technological metaphor and 
the cultural context of organizing
“Metaphorical personification, which has probably existed since the 
advent of human speech, has become extensive among computer scien­
tists and everyday users.. . .  Primitive man often personified natural 
objects by giving them divine status; perhaps we have shifted the deifi­
cation from nature to technology” [15, p. 215]. Drawing attention to the 
demonic quality of the phenomenon, MacCormac leads us back to Lapp’s 
“no single scientist in the engine cabin and there may be demons at the 
switch” metaphor and Edge’s theme of the “control” uses of technolog­
ical metaphors. The evolutionary imagery and social actorship rhetoric 
for computers, translated from the cybernetic sciences into (parts of) the 
social sciences, perpetuate the definitional and interpretive powers of 
technological institutions and protagonists they both criticized.
All things said, the problem of whether computers actually think or act 
like human beings (and whether they should therefore be treated analyt­
ically like social actors) cannot be taken care of by empirical argument— 
no more than deciding whether humans are really merely “a mass of cells 
and things” is an empirical matter [42, p. 97]. But technological meta­
phors transmitted by social scientists are used in oiganizations as linguis­
tic devices for controlling members’ interactions and for managing the 
meanings they attribute to technological context [43]. To this extent they 
become part of the cultural context of organizing and subject to empirical 
analysis.
Here one might pursue a “symmetry principle,” too: Let us treat those 
in control and those controlled in organizations—or, more precisely, 
controlling actions and controlled actions—in the same conceptual 
terms. And let us then find out which kinds of distributions of control 
power (which configuration of control/controlled activities over organi­
zation members) are bolstered or countered with what kind of technolog­
ical metaphor. Presumably, the locus of a rhetoric of animation and 
personification tends to be control activity; in turn, those members whose 
actions are pre-processed by computerized control systems might profit 
from understanding the processes that produce a need for reenchantment, 
if not mystification.
Ending this exercise on some aspects of social scientific constructions 
of computer realities, I should like to recall Donald McCloskey’s good 
advice concerning metaphors in social science. “Self-consciousness 
about metaphor would be an improvement on many counts. Most obvi­
ously, unexamined metaphor is a substitute for thinking—which is a 
recommendation to examine the metaphors, not to attempt the impossible 
by banishing them” [44, p. 81]. This applies, of course, to my metaphors 
as much as others.
Note
1. This essay is based in part on “Images of Technology in Sociology," Technology 
and Culture, 31 (2), 1990.
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